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Abstract 
This paper outlines the implications of neural-level accounts of insight, and models of the 
conceptual interactions that underlie creativity, for a theory of cultural evolution. Since elements 
of human culture exhibit cumulative, adaptive, open-ended change, it seems reasonable to view 
culture as an evolutionary process, one fueled by creativity. Associative memory models of 
creativity and mathematical models of how concepts combine and transform through interaction 
with a context, support a view of creativity that is incompatible with a Darwinian (selectionist) 
framework for cultural evolution, but compatible with a non-Darwinian (Self-Other 
Reorganization) framework. A theory of cultural evolution in which creativity is centre stage 
could provide the kind of integrative framework for the behavioral sciences that Darwin 
provided for the life sciences. 
Keywords 
Autocatalytic network; concept combination; context; creative process; creativity; cross-domain 
inspiration; cultural evolution; Darwinian theory; evolutionary theory; self-organization; 
selectionist theory; theoretical framework 
Highlights 
• Other species create but we alone exhibit cumulative open-ended cultural evolution.
• A theory of cultural evolution could provide a unifying framework for the social sciences.
• Creative thought is incompatible with a Darwinian framework for cultural evolution.
• Creativity is compatible with evolution through self-organization and communal exchange.
• Cultural novelty is generated when concepts manifest anew in response to context.
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Introduction 
There is literature on cross-cultural differences in creativity [1–3], the adaptive value of 
creativity and how human creativity evolved [4–7], as well as efforts to frame creativity as a 
Darwinian [8,9]1 and a nonDarwinian [11,12] evolutionary process. However, with some 
exceptions [13–15], there is a dearth of research on the implications of how the creative process 
works for the question of how culture evolves. This appears to be an outstanding gap in the 
literature given that creativity is what fuels cultural evolution, and a theory of cultural evolution 
could provide an integrative framework for the social sciences in much the same way that 
fragmentary biological knowledge was unified by Darwin’s theory of natural selection (and 
subsequently unified further by the neo-Darwinian synthesis, and research on epigenetic 
processes and complex systems [16,17]). This paper outlines how creativity research can 
contribute to this important enterprise. 
A new direction for creativity research 
Creative ideas are sometimes conceived of as discreet, separate entities much like objects in the 
physical world that can we search for and select amongst [8,9]. However, models of the 
contextual aspects of higher cognition [18–23], including concept combination and creativity 
[24–27], buttressed by neural-level accounts of memory and insight [28–30], point to a different 
view. This research suggests that thoughts and ideas are not separate and distinct but exist as part 
of an interwoven matrix until the instant you think of them. Moreover, each time you think of 
them they are reconstructed anew and you experience them differently, depending on the 
context, your recent experience, and what you have done and thought about since the last time 
you brought them to mind. Like Schrödinger’s famous cat that is neither dead nor alive, a 
concept or unborn idea—when you’re not thinking about it—neither exists nor does it not exist. 
It is in a what is called a ground state, a state of potentiality, and requires a context—something 
that brings it to mind—to actualize it. Much as if you shine light on an object from one direction 
it casts one shadow, and if you shine light from a different direction it casts another, the first time 
you try to articulate a creative idea it manifests as one output, and after thinking about it, it may 
manifest as a different output. Just because these two external realizations of the idea take 
different physical forms, that doesn’t mean there are two discrete representations in the mind. 
They may be different realizations of the same underlying idea at different phases of a creative 
honing process.  
Extending these ideas further lead to a new conception of the creative process. While the 
divergent and convergent phases of the creative process are often characterized respectively as 
generative and evaluative [31–33], associative memory models of creativity and mathematical 
models of how concepts combine and transform through interaction with a context suggest that 
phases of the creative process instead be characterized in terms of potentiality and actualization. 
In this view, the creative process begins with the recognition that one’s understanding of 
something is in a state of potentiality—i.e., vague, ill-defined, or engendering emotional 
turbulence—so one examines it from different angles to better understand it. This may involve 
the emergence of new candidate ideas, but also it may not; it may simply entail a sharpening of 
the originally vague idea. Evaluation is occurring throughout; the entire process of reflecting on 
1 However, previous supporters have backed away from this position, e.g., Simonton [12] has conceded 
that his theory’s “explanatory value does not depend on any specious association with Darwin’s theory of 
evolution”. 
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an idea consists of interactions between your current conception of it, and contexts you throw at 
it, and with each ‘reflection’ (interaction between idea and context) you evaluate the outcome. In 
the divergent phase of the creative process one reflects on the idea by considering it from 
unconventional contexts, and our ability to do this hangs on their ability to reform anew each 
time you think of them, as discussed above. In the latter convergent phase, the idea is refined by 
considering it in more conventional contexts, often generated through simulation of how others 
will receive it. 
 While these views on creativity are nascent, as we will see following a brief examination 
of the workings of evolutionary processes and culture in particular, they have implications for the 
question of how culture evolves, and could play a vital role in the development of a viable theory 
of cultural evolution. 
Cultural evolution as a unifying framework for the social sciences 
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection vastly enhanced our understanding of the 
organismal world by integrating scattered biological knowledge into a unified “tree of life”. 
Since art, technology, languages, and customs change over time in a manner seemingly 
reminiscent of biological evolution, it seemed reasonable to view culture as a second 
evolutionary process, fueled in this case by human creativity. Although other species exhibit 
both creativity and imitation, humans build on each others’ ideas, adapting them to our own 
tastes, needs, and desires, such that the process is open-ended, i.e., the space of possibilities 
cannot be pre-specified [34]. Thus, cumulative, adaptive, open-ended cultural evolution appears 
to be uniquely human. 
There is a long history of attempts to frame cultural evolution as a Darwinian 
evolutionary process [35], and although highly contentious, the approach is still widespread [36–
38]. A Darwinian process consists of two components: the generation of new variants, and the 
differential survival or selection of some of those variants, such that they live long enough to 
produce offspring. Since Darwin’s explanation focused not on the generation of variants but on 
the selection of some fraction of them, it can be referred to as a selectionist theory. Darwin 
posited that biological change is due to the effect of differential selection on the distribution of 
randomly generated heritable variation in a population over generations; in other words, 
‘survival of the fittest’. Organisms with adaptive traits have more offspring—i.e., are ‘selected’ 
for—and therefore, their traits proliferate over time. Notice that the theory operates on the 
timescale of generations, as it requires at a minimum a generation for change to occur. Note also 
that it assumes that variants are separate and distinct entities that can be selected amongst such 
that some survive and others do not.  
Dawkins [39] proposed that natural selection requires a replicator, which he defined as 
an entity with the following characteristics: fecundity (it replicates), longevity (it survives long 
enough to replicate), and fidelity (after several generations of replication, it is still almost 
identical to the original). Holland [40], a pioneer in the field of complex, adaptive systems, 
showed that this is necessary but not sufficient for a selectionist explanation to hold, and 
provided a more nuanced analysis of what is required (Table 1). 
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Replicator 
(Dawkins) 
Self-assembly Code 
(Holland) 
Self-replication  Yes Yes 
Fecundity; longevity; fidelity Yes Yes 
Passive copying and active transcription of self-
assembly instructions 
? Yes 
Sequestration of inherited information ? Yes 
Genotype / phenotype distinction ? Yes 
Transmission of acquired traits ? No 
Evolutionary processes it seeks to explain Biological, cultural Biological 
Table 1. Comparison of Dawkin’s view that natural selection requires  a replicator versus Holland’s view that it 
requires a self-assembly code. Both involve self-replication with fecundity, longevity, and fidelity. Only the self-
assembly code requires instructions for generating a copy of the self that are both passively copied and actively 
transcribed. As a result, only this view is committed with respect to (1) the sequestration of inherited information, 
(2) a clear distinction between genotype and phenotype, and (3) a prohibition on transmission of acquired traits. The 
replicator has been proposed as the central construct of an evolutionary framework for both biological and cultural 
evolution. Since cultural evolution lacks self-assembly instructions that are both passively copied and actively 
transcribed, the self-assembly code can function as the central construct for biological evolution only. 
Holland’s first requirement is randomly generated variation. A selectionist process works 
through competitive exclusion amongst existing variants; it does not work by affecting how 
variants are generated. In fact, to the extent that variation is not generated randomly, the 
distribution of variants reflects whatever was biasing the generation away from random in the 
first place, rather than survival of the fittest.  
Holland’s second requirement is negligible transmission of acquired traits. The reason a 
selectionist theory is applicable in biology is that there are two kinds of traits: (1) inherited traits 
(e.g., blood type or eye color), which are transmitted vertically from parent to offspring by way 
of the genes, and (2) acquired traits (e.g., a tattoo, or knowledge about pop stars), which are 
obtained during an organism’s lifetime, and which are sometimes called epigenetic because they 
are transmitted horizontally from outside sources, not vertically by way of genes. Because 
acquired traits are not passed down (e.g., you do not inherit your mother’s tattoo), the fast, intra-
generational transmission of acquired traits does not drown out the slow, inter-generational 
transmission of inherited traits. In other words, a selectionist explanation works when acquired 
change is negligible relative to inherited change; otherwise the first, which can operate in an 
instant, overwhelms the second, which requires generations. Thus, replicators could exist and 
evolve—i.e., exhibit cumulative, adaptive, open-ended change—but to the extent that variation 
was generated non-randomly, or that there was non-negligible transmission of acquired traits, 
their evolution could not be accounted for by the theory of natural selection; another theory is 
required to explain how they evolve. 
We know of no means of avoiding the transmission of acquired traits other than by way 
of a self-assembly code (such as the genetic code), i.e., a set of instructions for how to reproduce. 
Thus, the third requirement is precisely-orchestrated expression of a self-assembly code. In the 
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case of biological evolution this code takes the form of nucleotide pairs that make up our DNA2. 
In theory, it could take another form.3 But whatever this code is made of, its low-level 
information-bearing components must be organized in an orderly, predictable fashion so as to be 
amenable to parsing into meaningful units and thereby avoid disrupting the precisely 
orchestrated process by which it is expressed to generate offspring. In the case of biology these 
units are genes, which (by way of elaborate transcription and translation processes) are 
interpreted to make offspring. The genetic information in parental DNA must be similar enough 
at the lowest level of the basic building blocks of which they are composed (i.e., nucleotide 
pairs), otherwise they will not be parsed properly into genes when they are interpreted to make 
the traits, organs, systems, and so forth that comprise a viable offspring. 
Before examining whether cultural evolution meets Holland’s requirements for a 
selectionist explanation, we note that they are not always met in biology [16], though for many 
biological processes they are met sufficiently well that Darwin’s theory serves as an adequate 
explanatory model. Culture, however, is another matter [41]. First, cultural variation is not 
randomly generated. Darwinian cultural theorists sometimes concede this point [38], but fail to 
see that (1) this invalidates a Darwinian theory of culture (as explained above), and (2) a non-
Darwinian evolutionary theory of culture is possible (as explained below). Second, in cultural 
evolution, acquired traits are transmitted. Unlike biological evolution, in cultural evolution there 
is no mechanism by which changes acquired over a lifetime are shed on a regular basis at the end 
of each generation (e.g., once one cup had a handle, all cups could have handles). Therefore, 
acquired (horizontal) change can accumulate orders of magnitude faster than, and overwhelm, 
vertical change due to the mechanism Darwin proposed: differential replication of heritable 
variation in response to selection over generations. Third, culture lacks the precisely-
orchestrated expression of a self-assembly code. It is not the cultural artifact itself that 
spontaneously reproduces; it is human minds that make that happen. Even an artifact such as a 
blueprint that consists of coded assembly instructions is not a self-assembly code, i.e., it does not 
spontaneously reproduce new offspring blueprints. Indeed if, as discussed above, variants are not 
separate and distinct amongst such that some survive and others do not, but rather reassembled 
anew each time they are brought to mind, the replication of ideas can be highly imprecise. A 
thought or idea can merge with one or more other thoughts or ideas to produce something 
altogether new. For example, a playground designer might reconceive of a tire as a swing seat 
while a landscaper might pile old tires to make a retaining wall (Figure 1). This kind of extreme 
imprecision would not be viable in a system that relies upon low-level information-bearing 
components being organized in an orderly, predictable fashion so as to be parsed into meaningful 
units and expressed to generate offspring. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Although Darwin did not know of the existence of DNA, he was aware that some underlying mechanism 
was resulting in a prohibition on transmission of acquire traits. 
3 As per the substrate neutrality argument. 
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Figure 1. Cultural evolution of what to do with a tire. The concept TIRE can be adapted to these different contexts 
because when it is not thought about it exists in a ‘ground state’ of potentiality (a), and reforms anew when brought 
to bear on a particular situation (b and c). For a neighbor who needed a retaining wall, the affordance ‘can build with 
it’ enabled the concept TIRE to be reconceived of as a brick, while for a neighbour with horses the affordance ‘can 
fill it’ enables it to be thought of as a food bowl. (Photos taken by author.) 
This analysis precludes a selectionist but not an evolutionary framework for culture. The 
vital importance of non-Darwinian evolutionary processes is increasingly recognized [16,17,42]. 
Research on the origin of life suggests that early life consisted of autocatalytic protocells that 
evolved through a non-Darwinian process, and natural selection emerged later from this more 
haphazard ancestral evolutionary process [43–46]. This non-Darwinian process requires (1) a 
self-organizing network of components that generate new components through their interactions, 
(2) the network should be able to reconstitute another like itself through haphazard (not code-
driven) duplication of components, and (3) interaction amongst networks. This process can be 
referred to as Self-Other Reorganization (SOR) because it involves an interplay between self-
organized internal restructuring and communal exchange amongst autocatalytic structures. Like 
Darwinian evolution it has mechanisms for preserving continuity and for introducing novelty, 
but unlike Darwinian evolution it is a low-fidelity Lamarckian process (Table 2). 
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 Natural Selection Self-other Re-organization 
(SOR) 
Unit of self-replication DNA Self-organizing network 
Mechanism for 
preserving continuity 
Reproduction (vertical transmission), 
proofreading enzymes, etc. 
Communal exchange (a form of 
horizontal transmission) 
Mechanism for 
generating novelty 
Mutation, recombination Creativity and innovation, 
transmission error 
Self-assembly code  Yes No 
High fidelity Yes No 
Transmission of 
acquired traits 
No Yes 
Type of process  Darwinian Lamarckian (by some standards) 
Evolutionary processes 
it can explain 
Biological  Early life; horizontal gene transfer 
(HGT), cultural 
Table 2. Similarities and differences between two evolutionary frameworks: natural selection and SOR. Both have 
mechanisms for preserving continuity and introducing novelty. However, whereas natural selection is a high fidelity 
Darwinian process and the structure that self-replicates is self-assembly instructions, communal exchange is a low 
fidelity Lamarckian process, and the structure that replicates is a self-organizing network. Only SOR allows 
transmission of acquired traits. SOR is proposed to be the mechanism by which early life evolved as well as the 
mechanism by which culture evolves, and some aspects of present day life, such as horizontal gene transfer. 
 It has been proposed that, as did early life, culture evolves through SOR [47–53; see 54 
for a related approach]. Here, the self-organizing networks are not protocells exchanging 
catalytic molecules, but minds exchanging ideas. As parents and others share knowledge with 
children, an integrated understanding of the world takes shape in their minds, and they become 
creative contributors to cultural evolution.  
I emphasize that it is not claimed that Darwin’s theory of natural selection is incorrect, 
nor that it does not provide an adequate explanatory framework for biological evolution, merely 
that it does not provide an adequate explanatory framework for cultural evolution.4 
Challenges from creativity research for a viable theory of cultural evolution 
Despite calls to identify the cognitive mechanisms underlying cultural evolution [56,57], absent 
amongst the eight challenges posed in a recent effort to establish ‘grand challenges’ for cultural 
evolution research [57] is the challeng of understanding the creative processes that drive 
cultural evolution. However, creativity research is well poised to play a prominent role in 
establishing how culture evolves by offering a litmus test for a viable theory of cultural 
evolution. Let us propose the following challenges: a viable theory of cultural evolution must be 
able to explain and describe (1) Banksy’s expression of political convictions through art [59], (2) 
                                                 
4 Holland himself once used the term “Darwinian selection” loosely to refer to a situation in which 
“agents that collect resources more rapidly than others contribute more of their characteristics to future 
generations” [55, p. 56]. However, in this passage he is not trying to provide a comprehensive definition 
of what Darwinian selection entails as he was in [40]. He may well not have been aware of the extensive 
work by Carl Woese and others showing that it is possible to evolve through means other than Darwinian 
selection [43–46]. (Unfortunately since he is no longer with us we cannot ask him to clarify this.) 
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Led Zeppelin’s use of Lord of the Rings by Tolkien as inspiration for the songs “Battle of 
Evermore” and “Ramble On” [60], and (3) the ‘spinning’ of a news story to make it consistent 
with political convictions [61,62].  
A selectionist framework cannot begin to address such challenges because it requires that 
variation be randomly generated; it cannot account for the generation of ideas through strategy or 
intuition or thinking something through for oneself. Thus, it cannot account for processes in 
which an idea acquires non-random change within a mind (e.g., the idea behind Lord of the 
Rings transforming from a book to a song) between events in which communicated between 
minds (i.e., between reading the book and re-expressing it as a song). Since it requires a 
predictably organized self-assembly code so as not to disrupt the precisely orchestrated process 
of reproduction, it cannot accommodate findings such as that cross-domain inspiration is 
ubiquitous in creative thought [63]. (If a melody inspires a painting, for example, there is no self-
assembly code in this ‘lineage’ driving a precisely orchestrated reproduction process.) Many 
studies that claim to be about cultural evolution, such as studies of conformity bias [64], actually 
concern transmission. While transmission—the spread of existing traits—is a component of 
evolution, evolution additionally entails cumulative, adaptive, open-ended change. Studies that 
do incorporate cultural novelty are often limited to trivial sources such as ‘cultural mutation’ [65] 
or copying error [66], thereby neatly avoiding the issue of creativity. 
SOR can accommodate these challenges, because it does not require that novelty be 
randomly generated, and it lacks the key signature of a Darwinian process: prohibition on 
transmission of acquired traits. It is also consistent with the new view of creativity discussed 
earlier. Recall the notion that an unborn idea exists in a ground state of potentiality and requires a 
context to bring it to mind or actualize it. For any concept or idea, there exists some context—
some perspective or lens from which you could view it—that would motivate combining it with 
any other concept or idea. In other words, because our minds are integrated networks there is 
some possible situation that would inspire you to merge, say, the concepts ‘duck’ and ‘piano’. 
Since no combinations are a priori off limits we start to see how human creativity could be open-
ended. Moreover, if ideas are not discrete and separate until actualized by a context, it makes 
sense that the mind is what evolves through culture.  
Conclusions 
This article provided an overview of the rationale for, and current status of, the application of 
creativity research to the question of how culture evolves. The open-ended, cumulative nature of 
human creativity presents formidable challenges for a theory of cultural evolution. A Darwinian 
(selectionist) explanation requires that transmission of acquired traits be negligible so that 
change over generations are explicable in terms of selection of randomly generated heritable 
variation. We know of no means of accomplishing this other than by way of a self-assembly 
code, which requires low-level predictability of information-bearing components to ensure 
precise orchestration of the intricate processes culminating in reproduction. Culture does not 
meet these requirements because human creativity is non-random, ideas acquire change as 
people mull them over, and there is no self-assembly code. SOR, a lesser-known evolutionary 
framework for cultural evolution which does not require randomly generated novelty and allows 
transmission of acquired traits, appears consistent with current directions in creativity research. 
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In sum, as those most knowledgeable about the creative processes at the core of cultural 
evolution, no group of scholars is better positioned than creativity researchers to unravel the 
mystery of how culture evolves. 
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